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Abstract
Small and Rosen’s (Econometrica 49(1):105–130, 1981) method for measuring consumer 
surplus using discrete choice models has been widely adopted in public policy analysis. 
For the case of a price change, the present paper elucidates five theoretical assumptions 
inherent within Small and Rosen’s measure, and employs indifference maps to demonstrate 
that this measure is only applicable to the context of a single discrete choice free of non-
linear income effects. The paper argues that, where non-linear income effects are present, 
the aforementioned theoretical assumptions should be relaxed, and the consumption con-
text revised from discrete choice to discrete–continuous demand. Furthermore, the paper 
proposes a simple analytical method for approximating the expected Hicksian compen-
sating variation in the presence of non-linear income effects, and compares the empirical 
performance of this method against existing methods using data from Morey et al. (Am J 
Agric Econ 75(3):578–592, 1993). As well as offering a simple approximation, the pro-
posed method yields insights on the potential range of the compensating variation depend-
ing on the extent of switching between choice alternatives, and on the attribution of the 
compensating variation to the relevant choice alternatives.
Keywords Consumer surplus · Discrete choice models · Income effects · Discrete–
continuous demand · Compensating variation
1 Introduction
Discrete choice models are routinely commissioned by planning authorities, as a tool for 
predicting the impacts of policy interventions on demand and welfare. Such interventions 
may take many forms, but fundamental to economic interests are those which affect prices 
and/or incomes. Discrete choice models are conventionally estimated on individual-level 
preference data, whereas planning authorities are focussed more on the preferences of the 
market or society as a whole. This provokes an interesting question of how discrete choices 
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can be defensibly aggregated, so as to yield market- or societal-level forecasts of quantity 
demanded and welfare following price and/or income changes.
In what follows, we will conceptualise the interaction between choice and demand in 
terms of Small and Rosen’s (1981)1 model of discrete–continuous demand. According to 
this model, an individual is offered a set of mutually exclusive goods from which he/she is 
invited to select their preferred good (e.g. choice of recreation site) and, conditional upon 
that choice, the individual consumes a quantity of a commodity (e.g. number of trips to the 
chosen site). The principal outcome of S&R’s paper is the derivation of a consumer surplus 
measure specific to the discrete choice component of the discrete–continuous demand.2
S&R’s consumer surplus measure is defined in terms of the representative consumer 
(Gorman 1953), and conveniently allows the aggregation of discrete choices across indi-
viduals. However, as is widely acknowledged, a limiting property of S&R’s measure is that 
non-linear income effects3 of price (and lump sum income) changes are excluded. This 
property straightforwardly ensures path independence (Morey 1984), but is rather strong, 
and potentially introduces bias into the resulting measure of surplus. Recognising this limi-
tation, a number of contributors (e.g. Hau 1985; Jara-Díaz and Videla 1989, 1990; McFad-
den 1995; Herriges and Kling 1999; Karlström 1999; Karlström and Morey 2001; Dagsvik 
and Karlström 2005; de Palma and Kilani 2011) have explored methods for estimating the 
corresponding Hicksian compensating variation. The attraction of the compensating varia-
tion is that, unlike S&R’s measure, it elicits a path independent measure of consumer sur-
plus—even when non-linear income effects are admitted.
Against this background, the present paper will seek to make four contributions:
1. Following a brief overview of S&R’s welfare measure and elucidation of its underlying 
assumptions (Sect. 2), we will translate S&R’s algebraic presentation into a diagram-
matic one using indifference maps.
2. Using S&R’s model of discrete–continuous demand, we will develop an intuition for 
modelling linear income effects and/or substitution effects of price changes through the 
‘numeraire’ good (Sect. 3). Whilst S&R’s paper devotes only passing comment to the 
numeraire good, the present paper will show that it plays a crucial role within S&R’s 
consumer surplus measure.
3. With a few exceptions (e.g. Karlström and Morey 2001; de Palma and Kilani 2011), the 
literature has devoted limited discussion to the intuition behind non-linear income effects 
in discrete choice consumption contexts. Using S&R’s model of discrete–continuous 
demand, we will develop an intuition for modelling non-linear income effects of price 
changes through the conditional demand (Sect. 4).
4. Despite the interest in measuring the Hicksian compensating variation, practical appli-
cation has hitherto been impeded by the computational requirements of the candidate 
methods. Against this background, we will propose a simple method for approximating 
the Hicksian compensating variation (also Sect. 4), and illustrate its application using 
analytical and empirical examples (Sect. 5).
1 For brevity, we will refer to Small and Rosen (1981) simply as ‘S&R’ in the remainder of this paper.
2 S&R’s consumer surplus measure is derived in Eq. (12) of the present paper.
3 That is to say, income effects which entail a non-linear income expansion path, i.e. Engel curve.
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2  Some Preliminary Definitions and Concepts
This section will introduce notation and briefly summarise the standard presentation of 
S&R’s model of discrete–continuous demand. Readers already initiated in S&R may wish 
to proceed directly to Sect. 3.
2.1  S&R’s Model of Discrete–Continuous Demand
Following S&R, let us consider the problem of an individual consuming a bundle of three 
goods, where the first two goods are mutually exclusive, and the third good acts as a nume-
raire.4 More formally, the individual faces the following maximisation problem:
where u is direct utility; 퐱 =
(
x1, x2, xn
)
 is a bundle comprising the consumed quantities of 
goods 1, 2 and the numeraire good n ; 퐩 =
(
p1, p2, 1
)
 is the associated vector of prices for 
goods 1, 2 and n ; and y is income. The price of the numeraire good is set to one, such that 
the numeraire good and income are normalised to the same units. S&R conceptualised (1) 
as a problem of discrete–continuous demand, whereby the individual first chooses between 
goods 1 and 2 according to which yields the greater utility. We denote this choice:
where u∗ is the maximum direct utility given income y , v∗ is the maximum indirect utility, 
ṽk is the conditional indirect utility, and k indexes the chosen (i.e. utility maximising) good, 
i.e. k = 1 if ṽ1 ≥ ṽ2 , or k = 2 otherwise.
In the manner of S&R’s Eq. 3.16, let us relate the conditional demand x̃j (i.e. condi-
tional upon the discrete choice between goods 1 and 2) to the unconditional demand xj , as 
follows:
where 훿j is the uncompensated discrete choice indicator; e.g. 훿1 = 1 if k = 1 (i.e. if 
ṽ
1
(
p1, y
) ≥ ṽ
2
(
p2, y
)
 , and good 1 is therefore chosen) or 훿1 = 0 if k = 2 . S&R also pro-
posed a probabilistic notion of the discrete choice indicator,5 re-stating (3) in terms of the 
expected demand for goods 1 and 2, from the perspective of the representative consumer:
where 휋j denotes the uncompensated probabilistic demand for good j (i.e. 
∑
j=1,2 휋j(퐩, y) = 1).
(1)
Max u = u(퐱)
s.t. p1x1 + p2x2 + xn = y
x1x2 = 0
퐱 ≥ 0
(2)u∗(퐱) = v∗(퐩, y) = ṽk
(
pk, y
)
= Max
{
ṽ1
(
p1, y
)
, ṽ2
(
p2, y
)}
(3)xj(퐩, y) = 𝛿j(퐩, y) ⋅ x̃j
(
pj, y
)
for j = 1, 2
(4)xj(퐩, y) = 𝜋j(퐩, y) ⋅ x̃j
(
pj, y
)
for j = 1, 2
4 Other contributors to the literature (e.g. Bhat 2005) have categorised goods 1 and 2 as ‘inside’ goods, and 
the numeraire as the ‘outside’ good.
5 This re-statement has the effect of relaxing the constraint x1x2 = 0 , such that goods 1 and 2 can be con-
sumed in combination.
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2.2  Comparative Statics of the Discrete–Continuous Demand
Within the framework of (4), we can examine the comparative statics of the discrete–con-
tinuous demand in response to price changes, via the usual apparatus of the Slutsky equa-
tion. Batley and Ibáñez (2013a) presented detailed derivations of the Slutsky equation, 
expanding upon the working in S&R. For present purposes, it will suffice to simply report 
the outcomes of these derivations, which are as follows for the probabilistic and condi-
tional demands, respectively6:
where 휋c
j
 is the compensated probabilistic demand for good j , and x̃c
j
 is the compensated 
conditional demand for good j . In principle, (5) and (6) give rise to both a substitution 
effect (i.e. the first component of each summation) and an income effect (i.e. the second 
component). In practice, however, an income effect (at least a non-linear one) manifests 
only in the case of the conditional demand (6). This point, which we will justify in Sects. 3 
and 4, is fundamental to the present paper.
2.3  Econometric Specification of the Probabilistic Demand
The diagrammatic analysis that follows in subsequent sections will make an important dis-
tinction between the discrete–continuous demand [which gives rise to the expected demand 
(4)] and the restricted case of a single discrete choice (where x̃j = 1 for j = 1, 2 , and (4) 
simplifies to the probabilistic demand). Mindful of our interest in deriving consumer sur-
plus, it will be important to ensure that the probabilistic demand is consistent with micro-
economic theory, and this motivates our adoption of the Random Utility Model (RUM). 
With reference to Marschak (1960) and Block and Marschak (1960), who conceived RUM, 
and Daly and Zachary (1978), who formalised RUM in mathematical terms, define:
where ṽ
j
 is the conditional indirect utility of good j as before. If we then dissect conditional 
indirect utility such that ṽ
j
(
pj, y
)
= Wj
(
pj, y
)
+ 𝜀
j
 , where Wj is deterministic utility and 휀j is 
a random term independent of Wj , and substitute in (7), then we have:
where 휑 is the cumulative density function of 휀m − 휀j.
(5)
휕휋c
j
휕pj
=
휕휋j
휕pj
+
휕휋j
휕y
xj for j = 1, 2
(6)
𝜕x̃c
j
𝜕pj
=
𝜕x̃j
𝜕pj
+
𝜕x̃j
𝜕y
x̃j for j = 1, 2
(7)𝜋j = Pr
{
ṽ
j
(
pj, y
) ≥ ṽ
m
(
pm, y
)}
for j,m = 1, 2 m ≠ j
(8)
휋j = Pr
{
Wj
(
pj, y
)
+ 휀
j
≥ Wm(pm, y) + 휀m}
= 휑
(
Wj
(
pj, y
)
−Wm
(
pm, y
))
for j,m = 1, 2 m ≠ j
6 For notational brevity, the remainder of the paper will suppress functional dependencies where this is 
convenient and does not impinge upon the clarity of the analysis.
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Expanding upon previous work by others (e.g. Hau 1985, 1987; Jara-Díaz and Videla 
1990), Batley and Ibáñez (2013a) showed that, in the restricted case of discrete choice, 
compliance of the expected demand (4) with the fundamental properties of demand func-
tions—i.e. adding-up, negativity, homogeneity and symmetry—calls for five assumptions, 
as follows7:
Assumption I: unit conditional demand for goods 1 and 2, i.e. x̃1 = x̃2 = 1
Assumption II: for each good, equivalence (in absolute value) between the conditional 
marginal utilities of income and price, i.e. −휕W1∕휕p1 = 휕W1∕휕y, −휕W2∕휕p2 = 휕W2∕휕y
Assumption III: the conditional marginal utility of income is common across goods, 
i.e. 휕W1∕휕y =휕W2∕휕y = 휆
Assumption IV: the conditional marginal utility of price is common across goods, i.e. 
휕W1∕휕p1 =휕W2∕휕p2 = −휆
Assumption V: the conditional marginal utility of income is independent of the prices 
of goods 1 and 2, i.e. 휕휆∕휕p1 = 휕휆∕휕p2 = 0
Given Roy’s identity, some of these assumptions are inter-related, namely: Assumptions 
I and II each imply the other; Assumptions II and III together imply (but are not implied 
by) Assumption IV; and Assumptions II and IV together imply (but are not implied by) 
Assumption III. Thus, there are effectively three independent assumptions, and these 
assumptions will recur throughout the remainder of this paper.
2.4  Deriving Consumer Surplus from the Discrete–Continuous Demand
Completing our discussion of preliminary concepts, let us consider the change in consumer 
surplus associated with a given change in price with income held constant. We begin by 
deriving consumer surplus change from the general model of discrete–continuous demand, 
before restricting the model to discrete choice.
In general terms, and with reference to (1), consider the change in direct utility between 
Do-Nothing and Do-Something states (which we denote 0 and 1, respectively):
With reference to (2), we can re-state (9) equivalently in terms of indirect utility:
Substituting from (4), the expected discrete–continuous demand model gives rise to the 
following analogy to (10):
(9)Δu = u
(
퐱
1
)
− u
(
퐱
0
)
(10)Δu = Δv = v
(
퐩
1, y
)
− v
(
퐩
0, y
)
(11)
ΔE(v) = −𝜆 ⋅ �
퐩
1
퐩0
(∑
j=1,2
𝜋j(퐩, y) ⋅ x̃j
(
pj, y
))
d퐩
where 𝜋j(퐩, y) = 𝜋j
(
Wj
(
pj, y
)
−Wm
(
pm, y
))
for j,m = 1, 2 m ≠ j
7 Previous contributors (e.g. Hanemann 1982, 1999; Hau 1985, 1987) have exposed similar assumptions, 
but based on different rationales.
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and where 휆 denotes the conditional marginal utility of income for the representative con-
sumer.8 The change in expected consumer surplus is thus elicited by integrating the expec-
tation of the uncompensated (i.e. Marshallian) demands for goods 1 and 2 with respect 
to the relevant price change, and transforming the resulting money measure into utils by 
means of the marginal utility of income, i.e. 휆.
Let us now focus upon the probabilistic demand, which restricts (11) to the case of a 
single discrete choice (i.e. x̃j = 1 for j = 1, 2 ). Referring back to (8), which introduced 
RUM, deterministic utility is a function of price, but the random term is independent of 
price. On this basis, the change in expected consumer surplus can be elicited by integrating 
the uncompensated probabilistic demand with respect to the change in deterministic utility 
associated with the change in price.
Since RUM embodies the ‘translational invariance’ property, meaning that only dif-
ferences in deterministic utility influence probability, and because we are working in the 
binary case, consumer surplus change can be measured from the perspective of either good 
1 or good 2. In the particular case where the random term in (8) is distributed Multivariate 
Extreme Value (MEV), RUM adopts the logit form, and (12) gives rise to the well-known 
‘log sum’ formulation:
Batley and Ibáñez (2013a) showed that, given Assumptions I–V, non-linear income 
effects of price (and lump sum income) changes will be excluded. Furthermore, if linear 
as well as non-linear income effects are absent, then (13) can be interpreted not only as the 
expected change in Marshallian consumer surplus, but also as the expected Hicksian com-
pensating variation.
3  The Income Effects of a Price Change in the Discrete Choice Case
From a Marshallian perspective (i.e. admitting income effects of a price change, poten-
tially in a non-linear fashion), the consumer surplus change can be represented as (10). 
Alternatively, the consumer surplus change can be measured using methods devised by 
Hicks (1943) and Slutsky (1915), which extract any income effects and in so doing ensure 
path independence. These measures determine the minimum/maximum quantity of money 
that must be given to/can be taken from an individual in order to leave him/her at the 
same utility (in the case of Hicks) or demand (in the case of Slutsky) as before the price 
increase/decrease. In more formal terms, these measures arise from the following identi-
ties, respectively:
(12)ΔE(v) = �
W1
j
W0
j
휋j
(
Wj
(
pj, y
)
−Wm
(
pm, y
))
dWj for j,m = 1, 2 m ≠ j
(13)ΔE(v) = ln
(∑
j=1,2
exp
(
Wj
(
p1
j
, y
)))
− ln
(∑
j=1,2
exp
(
Wj
(
p0
j
, y
)))
(14)v
(
퐩
1, y − h
)
= v
(
퐩
0, y
)
8 See Batley and Ibáñez (2013b) for a discussion of the functional dependence of 휆 on prices and income, 
and the implications for path dependence in the case of sequential price/income changes.
The Intuition Behind Income Effects of Price Changes in Discrete…
1 3
where h is the Hicksian compensating variation, and s is the Slutsky compensating varia-
tion. Conventionally, h, s < 0 in the case of a price increase, and h, s > 0 in the case of a 
price reduction. A focus of the subsequent discussion will be the presence or absence of 
income effects and, by implication, the distinction between path dependent and path inde-
pendent measures of consumer surplus change.
3.1  A Diagrammatic Exposition of the Discrete–Continuous Demand Problem
Having introduced S&R’s discrete–continuous demand problem algebraically, the subse-
quent discussion will translate the algebraic analysis into a diagrammatic one—this exer-
cise will expose some additional features of the problem at hand.
From a deterministic (3) as opposed to probabilistic (4) perspective, it will prove useful 
to tighten S&R’s commentary around the budget constraint in (1), by re-stating:
This re-statement clarifies that demand for the numeraire will be conditioned by the choice 
of good 1 or 2, since expenditure on either good may vary, and the numeraire will account for 
the residual of the budget once this expenditure has been transacted. Whilst not explicitly 
discussed by S&R, (16) alludes to the key property that, provided the numeraire is infinitely 
divisible, goods 1 or 2 can be combined with the numeraire to form composite goods.
In the case of a single discrete choice, (16) further simplifies to:
Conditional upon choosing a single unit of either good 1 or 2, it must then hold that:
Clearly, if xn||𝛿+
j
> 0 then y
/
pj > 1 . Furthermore, define:
where p̃j is the conditional price of goods j = 1, 2 , which might otherwise be interpreted 
as the price of the relevant composite good. That is to say, since the same budget applies to 
both goods 1 and 2, and the numeraire accounts for any residual of that budget, the choice 
between goods 1 and 2 can alternatively be conceptualised as choosing between single 
units of their respective composite goods.
From (19), it must further hold that:
(15)퐱
(
퐩
1, y − s
)
= 퐱
(
퐩
0, y
)
(16)y =
∑
j=1,2
𝛿j⋅
(
pjx̃j + xn
||𝛿+
j
)
(17)y =
∑
j=1,2
훿j ⋅
(
pj + xn
||훿+
j
)
(18)y
pj
=
pj + xn
||훿+
j
pj
for j = 1, 2
(19)y
p̃j
=
pj + xn
||𝛿+
j
p̃j
= 1 for j = 1, 2
p1 + xn
||𝛿+
1
p2 + xn
||𝛿+
2
=
p̃1
p̃2
= 1
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Thus, in State 0, it must be the case that the conditional prices of goods 1 and 2 are 
equal.9
Against this background, Figs.  1 and 2 show an indifference map for an individual 
defined on the dimensions x1 and x2 ; the distinction between the two figures is that the first 
refers to the general case of discrete–continuous demand, whereas the second refers to the 
restricted case of a single discrete choice.
If we substitute for x1 and x2 using our discrete–continuous demand model (3), which 
employs the deterministic discrete choice indicator, then we can represent the indifference 
maps on the dimensions 𝛿1 ⋅ x̃1 and 𝛿2 ⋅ x̃2 . If we further assume x0n||훿+
j
= 0 for j = 1, 2 , such 
that demand for the numeraire good is zero in State 0, then this will afford us a degree of 
expositional convenience (but this assumption will be relaxed in the practical applications 
of Sect. 5). On this basis, define 퐱0 =
(
x0
1
, x0
2
, 0
)
 to be the vector of demands (comprising 
the quantities of goods 1, 2 and n , respectively) at initial prices 퐩0 =
(
p0
1
, p0
2
, 1
)
 . If we also 
assume x1x2 = 0 as per (1), then consumption is further restricted to one of two specific 
bundles (i.e. 훿1 = 1 and 훿2 = 0 if good 1 is chosen, or vice versa if good 2 is chosen),10 such 
that budget will be wholly devoted to:
• Good 1, giving rise to 퐱0 =
(
x̃0
1
, 0, 0
)
 ; or
• Good 2, giving rise to 퐱0 =
(
0, x̃0
2
, 0
)
.
Since the budget constraint in (1) is specified as an equality, consumption of either bun-
dle will exhaust total budget y,11 giving rise to one of the following corner solutions:
If we now consider a change in prices from 퐩0 in the Do-Nothing to 퐩1 =
(
p1
1
, p1
2
, 1
)
 
in the Do-Something, entailing a reduction in the price of good 2 with other prices held 
constant, then feasible consumption of good 2 will increase, whilst feasible consumption of 
good 1 will remain unchanged, i.e.
This case is shown explicitly in Fig. 1, where the initial budget constraint is labelled 퐩0 , 
and the new budget constraint following the price reduction is labelled 퐩1 . That is to say, 
the reduction in the price of good 2 is represented by the budget constraint pivoting on 
the allocation 
(
x̃0
1
, 0, 0
)
 , and outwards from 
(
0, x̃0
2
, 0
)
 to 
(
0, x̃1
2
, 0
)
 . The same case is shown 
implicitly in Fig. 2, where the increased purchasing power arising from the price reduc-
tion is represented in terms of increased consumption of the numeraire good—as proxy 
(20)x̃
0
1
=
y
p0
1
, x̃0
2
=
y
p0
2
(21)x̃
1
1
=
y
p1
1
= x̃0
1
, x̃1
2
=
y
p1
2
> x̃0
2
9 This property is not as restrictive as it might seem, since it follows from the manner in which the ‘goods’ 
and the ‘budget’ are defined at the outset. Consider for example a choice between a vacation, with an actual 
price of £2000, and a ‘staycation’ with an actual price of £0; let us assume that consumption of the vacation 
exhausts the available budget. Since the foregoing of the vacation will—in effect—release £2000 for con-
sumption of the numeraire good, we can conceptualise good 1 as the vacation (at a unit price of £2000) and 
good 2 as the numeraire consumption associated with the staycation (also at a notional unit price of £2000). 
On this basis, one unit of either good will exhaust the budget.
10 Note that (2) excludes the case where neither good 1 nor good 2 is chosen.
11 This reflects the simplifying assumption x0
n
= 0.
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for increased consumption of good 2. This distinction will be discussed further in what 
follows.
3.2  The Three Demand Responses
Supported by the above rationale, let us further develop the example of a reduction in the 
price of good 2, distinguishing between the effects on the discrete choice and the condi-
tional demand respectively. In relating (20) and (21) to S&R’s problem of discrete–con-
tinuous demand, we must countenance the possibility that a change in prices may induce a 
change in preferences in (2), i.e. the utility maximising good k in States 0 and 1 may differ. 
On this basis, Karlström and Morey (2001) considered three groups of individuals, namely:
• Group A: individuals who choose good 1 both before and after the reduction in the 
price of good 2;
• Group B: individuals who choose good 2 both before and after the reduction in the 
price of good 2;
• Group C: individuals who choose good 1 before the reduction in the price of good 2, 
and good 2 after.
The subsequent sections will consider Groups A, B and C diagrammatically, showing the 
demand response and compensating variation in each instance.
3.2.1  Group A
With regards to Group A, and drawing reference to both Figs. 1 and 2, consider an indi-
vidual who chooses good 1 both before, i.e. 퐱0
A
=
(
x̃0
1
, 0, 0
)
 , and after, i.e. 퐱1
A
=
(
x̃1
1
, 0, 0
)
 , 
the reduction in the price of good 2. Since x̃0
1
= x̃1
1
 and x̃0
2
= x̃1
2
= 0 , the price reduction has 
no impact on demand (or welfare).
3.2.2  Group B
With regards to Group B, consider an individual who chooses good 2 both before and after 
the reduction in the price of good 2, i.e. 퐱0
B
=
(
0, x̃0
2
, 0
)
 and 퐱1
B
=
(
0, x̃1
2
, 0
)
 . With reference 
to Fig. 1, the increased purchasing power associated with the reduction in p2 is entirely 
devoted to increased conditional demand for good 2, i.e. x̃1
2
> x̃0
2
 . On this basis, we can 
develop a Slutsky decomposition of the price reduction, by tracing the budget constraint 
applying to the new prices 퐩1 back to the initial bundle 퐱0
B
=
(
0, x̃0
2
, 0
)
 , using the construct 
of the dotted budget constraint. Relating this decomposition to the Slutsky equation for the 
conditional demand (6), the price reduction affects only the demand for good 2, implying 
that there is zero substitution between goods 1 and 2, and that the increase in demand for 
good 2 arises from a quasi-linear income effect. Since 퐱1
B
=
(
0, x̃1
2
, 0
)
 entails a corner solu-
tion, the compensating variation s̃2 shown in Fig. 1 employs demand (rather than utility) 
as the benchmark [i.e. in the manner of (15)], and should therefore be interpreted as the 
conditional Slutsky compensating variation; the same interpretation applies to Group C in 
the following sub-section.
With reference to Fig.  2, we can repeat our consideration of Group B but this time 
imposing x̃1 = x̃2 = 1 (i.e. Assumption I), which restricts our model of discrete–continu-
ous demand to a single discrete choice. If the discrete choice between goods 1 and 2 is the 
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0p 1p
O 02x
1
2x
0 1
1 1x x=
1 1 1x xδ= ⋅
2 2 2x xδ= ⋅
2s
Fig. 1  Discrete-continuous demand for goods 1 and 2 in response to a price reduction, given a deterministic 
discrete choice indicator
0p 1p
O
2s
2 2 2x xδ= ⋅0 1
2 2 1x x= =
0 1
1 1 1x x= =
1 1 1x xδ= ⋅
2
1 1
21 nx pδ ++
Fig. 2  Discrete choice for goods 1 and 2 and demand for the numeraire good in response to a price reduc-
tion, given a deterministic discrete choice indicator
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extent of the individual’s consumption possibilities, then y = p̃1 = p̃2 must hold in both the 
Do-Nothing and Do-Something via (17), and the individual will be unable to realise the 
potential for a compensating variation by consuming additional units of good 2.12 On the 
other hand, if in the Do-Something we admit the numeraire good (i.e. x1
n
> 0 ), then we can 
via (18) derive an analogy to (21):
where good 2 is reconstituted as a composite of the numeraire good, and the numeraire 
effectively becomes a proxy for the conditional Slutsky compensating variation. Given the 
reduction in the price of good 2, the individual is able to consume the initial bundle 
퐱
0
B
= (0, 1, 0) with reduced income, and can additionally devote the income saving to con-
sumption of the numeraire good, realising a final bundle 퐱1
B
=
(
0, 1, x1
n
||훿+
2
)
 . That is to say, 
in the event that x̃0
2
= x̃1
2
= 1 becomes a limiting property, the numeraire good can compen-
sate for the inability of the individual to consume additional units of good 2. Therefore, 
even in the restricted case of a single discrete choice, the individual can—through admis-
sion of the numeraire good in the Do-Something—realise the conditional Slutsky compen-
sating variation ( ̃s2 in Fig. 2) from the reduction in the price of good 2.
3.2.3  Group C
With regards to Group C, consider an individual who chooses good 1 before the reduction 
in the price of good 2, and good 2 after. Returning to the discrete–continuous case (Fig. 1), 
the relevant consumption bundles are 퐱0
C
=
(
x̃0
1
, 0, 0
)
 and 퐱1
C
=
(
0, x̃1
2
, 0
)
 . This situation 
comes with some difficulties of interpretation. One way of interpreting Group C would be 
to reason that the change in demand from the initial bundle 퐱0
C
 to the new bundle 퐱1
C
 repre-
sents a pure substitution effect, but with no compensating variation, since both bundles fall 
on the new budget constraint under prices 퐩1 . However, the proposition that a price reduc-
tion realises no compensating variation might appear less than intuitive. If that were the 
case, the consumer would have no incentive to switch. With that sentiment in mind, let us 
develop an alternative interpretation by acknowledging that good 1 was preferred to good 
2 at prices 퐩0 . Since good 1 must have been at least as attractive as good 2 at those prices 
(i.e. u
(
x̃0
1
, 0, 0
) ≥ u(0, x̃0
2
, 0
)
 ), we can trace the budget constraint applying to the new prices 
퐩
1 back to the bundle 
(
0, x̃0
2
, 0
)
 , and reason that, depending on the strength of preference 
for 
(
x̃0
1
, 0, 0
)
 over 
(
0, x̃0
2
, 0
)
 at prices 퐩0 , the conditional Slutsky compensating variation of 
the change in prices to 퐩1 must be within the range zero to s̃2 . That is to say, if the individ-
ual had been indifferent between 
(
x̃0
1
, 0, 0
)
 and 
(
0, x̃0
2
, 0
)
 at 퐩0 , then the conditional Slutsky 
compensating variation would be s̃2 . On the other hand, if 
(
x̃0
1
, 0, 0
)
 had been strongly pre-
ferred to 
(
0, x̃0
2
, 0
)
 , then the compensating variation would be closer to zero, consistent with 
our initial line of reasoning.
If we now restrict Group C to a single discrete choice but admit the numeraire good in 
the Do-Something (Fig. 2), then the relevant bundles before and after the reduction in the 
price of good 2 become 퐱0
C
= (1, 0, 0) and 퐱1
C
=
(
0, 1, x1
n
||훿+
2
)
 respectively. In an analogous 
x̃1
2
=
y
p1
2
=
p1
2
+ x1
n
||𝛿+
2
p1
2
= 1 +
x1
n
||𝛿+
2
p1
2
12 Recall the assumption x0
n
= 0.
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manner to Group B, the conditional Slutsky compensating variation can in this case be 
realised through the numeraire good (whilst acknowledging that the point of switching 
remains uncertain).
3.3  Rationalising the Practical Application of S&R’s Consumer Surplus Measure
The previous section has clarified that, for the restricted case of a single discrete choice, 
any compensating variation of a price change will, in principle, be due to a quasi-linear 
income effect (Group B) or a pure substitution effect (Group C). Accordingly, there is no 
conceptual basis for a non-linear income effect. In practice, however, it is important to 
understand two factors that will influence the magnitude of the aggregate compensating 
variation across the population; first, the composition of the population in terms of Group 
B and C individuals, and second, the strength of preference for good 2 over good 1 in the 
case of Group C individuals. In contrast to Sect. 3.2, which employed the discrete choice 
indicator [i.e. emanating from (3)], these factors call for the employment of the probabilis-
tic choice indicator [i.e. emanating from (4)].
From a probabilistic perspective, it will again prove useful to tighten S&R’s commen-
tary around the budget constraint in (1), by re-stating:
Analogous to the deterministic case, the probabilistic case can thus be conceptualised 
as a choice between two composite goods (i.e. combining either good 1 or 2 with the 
numeraire).
Substituting for x1 and x2 using (4), Fig. 3 shows an indifference map defined on the 
dimensions 𝜋1 ⋅ x̃1 and 𝜋2 ⋅ x̃2 . If we further assume x0n||훿+
j
= 0 for j = 1, 2 , such that demand 
for the numeraire good is zero in State 0, then this will again afford us a degree of exposi-
tional convenience (but this assumption will be relaxed in the practical applications of 
Sect. 5). On this basis, and in common with Figs. 1 and 2, define 퐱0 =
(
x0
1
, x0
2
, 0
)
 to be the 
vector of demands (comprising the quantities of goods 1, 2 and n , respectively) at initial 
prices 퐩0 =
(
p0
1
, p0
2
, 1
)
 . Unlike Figs. 1 and 2 which imposed the constraint x1x2 = 0 , Fig. 3 
effectively relaxes this constraint, thereby allowing consumption of both goods 1 and 2 in 
combination.13 Referring back to Sect. 2.3, Fig. 3 allows the relaxation of Assumptions I 
and II (i.e. allowing the conditional demand for good 2 to be greater than one) and the 
relaxation of Assumption IV (i.e. potentially admitting a substitution effect, as will be dis-
cussed in what follows).
Whilst permitting such generality, it will be attractive from an expositional perspective 
to define State 0 in analogous terms to Fig. 2, such that Fig. 2 can be conceptualised as a 
restrictive case of Fig. 3. To this end, assume that State 0 entails unit conditional demands 
for goods 1 and 2 (i.e. x̃0
1
= x̃0
2
= 1 , as per Assumption I); given zero demand for the numer-
aire, this assumption implies that goods 1 and 2 have common prices. Furthermore, assume 
that goods 1 and 2 have equal probability of being chosen (i.e. 휋0
1
= 휋0
2
= 0.5 ), implying 
that there are no differences in quality between the two goods. Whereas in the deterministic 
y =
∑
j=1,2
𝜋j⋅
(
pjx̃j+xn
||𝛿+
j
)
13 Note that the relaxation of Assumptions I, II and IV is analogous to Hausman et al.’s analysis (1995), 
whilst the relaxation of x1x2 = 0 follows the precedent of Hendel (1999), Bhat (2005) and others, who 
referred to this case as ‘multiple discrete choice’ (MDC).
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case consumption is restricted to allocations at either extreme of the budget line, the proba-
bilistic case re-conceptualises the budget line as a continuum of possible allocations sub-
ject to the choice probabilities adding to one. In other words, the budget line also consti-
tutes an indifference line. Therefore, whilst Fig. 3 assumes 휋0
1
= 휋0
2
= 0.5 in State 0, any 
deviation from these probabilities would entail a movement along the budget line. To illus-
trate, let us now change prices from 퐩0 to 퐩1 , where State 1 entails a reduction in the price 
of good 2 with other prices held constant. This provokes the following demand responses:
• First, there is a substitution effect that accounts for an increase in the expected demand 
for the numeraire good from zero (i.e. the initial normalisation) to 휋1
2
⋅
(
x1
n,se
/
p1
2
)
,14 
and the movement from 퐱0 to the intermediate bundle 퐱se . This substitution effect can 
be further decomposed into the movement from 퐱0 to 퐱se
휋
 , which accounts for the 
increase in the probability of choosing good 2 given conditional demands of one unit 
(i.e. along the line from x̃0
1
= x̃1
1
= 1 to x̃0
2
= x̃1
2
= 1 , such that 𝜋1
1
< 𝜋1
2
 ), whilst the 
remainder of the movement to 퐱se accounts for substitution between good 1 and the 
numeraire. This substitution effect will be driven by Group C individuals.
• Second, there is an income effect specific to the numeraire good. This accounts for a 
further increase in the expected demand for the numeraire by 휋1
2
⋅
(
x1
n,ie
/
p1
2
)
 , and the 
movement from 퐱se to the final equilibrium bundle 퐱1 . Consistent with path independ-
ence, the income expansion path ( IEP ) is linear. This income effect will be driven by 
Group B individuals.
The total demand response in the Do-Something is given by the expected demand for the 
numeraire good, i.e. 휋1
2
⋅
(
x1
n
/
p2
)
= 휋1
2
⋅
((
x1
n,se
/
p1
2
)
+
(
x1
n,ie
/
p1
2
))
 . Within this, the 
contribution from the substitution effect can be otherwise interpreted as the expected Slut-
sky compensating variation. Further to the earlier comment following (13), although non-
linear income effects are absent from Fig. 3, the linear income effect represented by the 
IEP will result in a discrepancy between the expected Slutsky compensating variation and 
the expected change in Marshallian consumer surplus.
4  The Income Effects of a Price Change in the Discrete Continuous Case
A key point emerging from Sect. 3 is that, in the restricted case of a single discrete choice, 
there is no facility for non-linear income effects of a price change. Indeed, we have sought 
to clarify that the method of employing the numeraire good as a proxy for the conditional 
demands for goods 1 and 2 is appropriate for representing linear income effects or substitu-
tion effects of a price change. The numeraire good cannot be similarly employed as a proxy 
where income effects are non-linear; this is clear from Marshall’s (1920) definition of the 
numeraire good in the context of partial equilibrium analysis.15 In order to admit non-lin-
earity, we must instead represent income effects in terms of the (unrestricted) conditional 
demands for goods 1 and 2, as will now be demonstrated.
14 To achieve a degree of efficiency in notation, we now omit conditioning by choice.
15 This was pointed out to the first author by Robert Cochrane in the course of private communication.
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4.1  Admitting Non‑linear Income Effects of a Price Change
Drawing upon the Slutsky equations  (5) and (6), this section will formalise the proposi-
tion that non-linear income effects of a price change must be accommodated through the 
conditional demands, before presenting a diagrammatic illustration. The latter will provide 
the germ of a practical solution for measuring the compensating variation, which we will 
develop in Sect. 4.2.2. Let us begin by writing the Slutsky equation for the unconditional 
(expected) demand as a whole, i.e. combining (5) and (6):
In the context of (22), we will consider the potential for separate income effects of price 
changes in relation to the probabilistic and conditional demands.
With regards to the probabilistic demand within (22), and making use of the RUM 
definition (8), let us write the column matrix 훈 consisting of the income effects of price 
changes on goods 1 and 2 (i.e. 휕휋j
/
휕y ⋅ xj):
If we substitute for the unconditional (expected) demand using (4), acknowledge 
that 휕휋1∕휕W1 = 휕휋2∕휕W2 holds by definition (Daly and Zachary 1978), and impose 
(22)
𝜕xc
j
𝜕pj
=
(
𝜕𝜋j
𝜕pj
+
𝜕𝜋j
𝜕y
xj
)
⋅ x̃c
j
+ 𝜋c
j
⋅
(
𝜕x̃j
𝜕pj
+
𝜕x̃j
𝜕y
x̃j
)
for j = 1, 2
(23)훈
(
휋1,휋2
)
=
[ 휕휋1
휕W1
휕W1
휕y
x1
휕휋2
휕W2
휕W2
휕y
x2
]
sex
0p 1p
0x
O
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1 1 1x x= =
0 1
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1x
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0
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Fig. 3  Discrete choice for goods 1 and 2 and demand for the numeraire good in response to a price reduc-
tion, given a probabilistic discrete choice indicator
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Assumptions I and III (which apply to the case of a single discrete choice, see Sect. 2.3), 
then (23) simplifies to:
In this way, (24) gives rise to the case shown in Fig. 3. Provided the numeraire good is 
present in the Do-Something, any income effects of price changes will be linear (i.e. com-
mon to goods 1 and 2), and collectively constrained by the requirement for 휋1 + 휋2 = 1.16
With regards to the conditional demand within (22), we can repeat the same exercise by 
writing the column matrix 훈 of the income effects of price changes on goods 1 and 2 (i.e. 
𝜕x̃j
/
𝜕y ⋅ x̃j):
Unlike (24), (25) imposes no restriction on the prevalence, linearity and magnitude of 
income effects.
If we now combine (23) and (25), then this gives rise to the more general case of Fig. 4, 
which shows the change in expected demands arising from a change in prices. In response 
to a change in prices from 퐩0 to 퐩1 , entailing a reduction in the price of good 2 with other 
prices held constant, the individual moves from the initial bundle 퐱0 to the final bundle 퐱1 . 
This movement can be decomposed as follows.
• First, there is a substitution effect that accounts for an increase in the expected demand 
for good 2 from 0.5 in the Do-Nothing17 to 0.5 + x1
2,se
 in the Do-Something, and the 
movement from 퐱0 to the intermediate bundle 퐱se . Again, this substitution effect can be 
further decomposed into the movement from 퐱0 to 퐱se
휋
 , which accounts for an increase 
in the probability of choosing good 2 given conditional demands of one unit, and the 
remaining movement to 퐱se , which accounts for substitution between the conditional 
demands for goods 1 and 2.
• Second, there are income effects on the conditional demands for both goods 1 and 2. 
With regards to good 2, this accounts for a further increase in the expected demand by 
x1
2,ie
 , and the movement from 퐱se to the final equilibrium bundle 퐱1.
In common with Fig. 3, Fig. 4 allows the relaxation of Assumptions I, II and IV. In contrast 
to Fig. 3, Fig. 4 also allows the relaxation of Assumption V, which gives rise to a non-
linear income expansion path ( IEP ). Summing the two demand responses, the expected 
demand for good 2 in the Do-Something is given by x1
2
= 0.5 + x1
2,se
+ x1
2,ie
 . This reflects 
the minimum conditional demand of one unit for both goods 1 and 2 and, provided these 
goods are infinitely divisible, the potential for additional conditional demand in excess of 
one.
(24)훈
(
휋1,휋2
)
=
[ 휕휋1
휕W1
휕W1
휕y
휋1
휕휋1
휕W1
휕W1
휕y
휋2
]
(25)훈
(
x̃1, x̃2
)
=
[
𝜕x̃1
𝜕y
x̃1
𝜕x̃2
𝜕y
x̃2
]
17 This follows from the normalisation x0
n
= 0 and p0
1
= p0
2
 in the Do-Nothing.
16 Note that there is a similar discussion in Jara-Díaz and Videla (1990).
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4.2  Methods for Measuring the Expected Compensating Variation
At long last, we are now equipped to address the primary objective of the paper, which is 
to inform methods for measuring the compensating variation of a price change in the pres-
ence of non-linear income effects. With reference to the Slutsky equation (22), it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that a price change could, in principle, impact upon either or both of 
the component parts of the expected demand, namely the probabilistic demand (23) and the 
conditional demand (25). Previous attempts at measuring the expected compensating vari-
ation in the presence of non-linear income effects (e.g. Karlström and Morey 2001) have 
focussed upon the identity:
where v∗ = Max
{
ṽ1, ṽ2
}
 , h is the Hicksian compensating variation (both uncondition-
ally and conditionally), and the 0 and 1 superscripts denote the states before and after a 
change in prices with income constant. A common simplifying assumption [e.g. McFadden 
(1995)] is that the random terms are equal across the two states (i.e. 휀0
j
= 휀1
j
 for j = 1, 2 ); 
this is consistent with the earlier assumption concerning the independence of the random 
terms from deterministic utility in (8). The identity (26) has two features which distinguish 
it from (14). First, it is defined in terms of maximum indirect utility; this reflects the dis-
crete choice context, and the possibility that the chosen good could differ before and after 
the change in prices (i.e. Group C, Sect. 3.2.3). Second, it is defined in terms of the expec-
tation of maximum indirect utility; this reflects the definition of RUM (8), and the fact that, 
in identifying the utility-maximising good, the difference in random terms could poten-
tially outweigh the difference in deterministic utilities.
4.2.1  Existing Methods for Measuring the Expected Compensating Variation
Although the literature has proposed a number of methods for estimating the expected 
Hicksian compensating variation in (26), the contributions of McFadden (1995) and Karl-
ström and Morey (2001) have attracted particular attention.
McFadden’s is a simulation-based method which involves the following steps. First, 
with reference to (8), a draw t is made of the random term 휀j,t for j = 1, 2 . Second, on the 
basis of this draw, the quantity v∗
t
(
퐩
0, y
)
 is calculated, thereby establishing the maximum 
utility in State 0. Third, considering goods 1 and 2 separately, the following identity is 
solved for h̃j,t:
where h̃
j,t
 is the conditional Hicksian compensating variation for good j = 1, 2 and draw 
t . Fourth, for each draw, the maximum (for a price reduction, i.e. h∗
t
= Max
{
h̃1,t, h̃2,t
}
 ) or 
minimum (for a price increase) compensating variation is identified. Finally, h∗
t
 is enumer-
ated across draws. Although the method yields an exact estimate of the expected Hick-
sian compensating variation, it entails substantial computation, and practical application 
has been limited. In an attempt to reduce computational burden, Morey et al. (1993) pro-
posed an approximation to McFadden’s method which solves (26) for a representative 
consumer; Zhao and Huang’s (2017) recent paper has reconsidered the accuracy of this 
approximation.
(26)E
(
v∗
(
퐩
1, y − h
))
= E
(
v∗
(
퐩
0, y
))
Wj
(
p1
j
, y − h̃j,t
)
+ 𝜀j,t = v
∗
t
(
퐩
0, y
)
for j = 1, 2
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Karlström and Morey’s is an analytical method, which derives the following identity for 
the expected income E(a) required in State 1 so as to maintain the expected utility realised 
in State 0:
where ?̂?j = ?̂?j
(
Wj
(
p1
j
, ỹ
jj
)
−Wm
(
p1
m
, ỹ
mm
))
 is the probability of choosing good j in a 
RUM where the deterministic utilities of j and m are a function of their respective prices in 
State 1 and respective incomes ỹ
jj
 and ỹ
mm
 ; ỹ
jj
 is the income required in State 1 to maintain 
the deterministic utility realised in State 0, if good j were chosen in both states (and simi-
larly for ỹ
mm
 ); ⌢𝜋j =
⌢
𝜋j
(
Wj
(
p1
j
, y
)
−W∗
m
)
 is the probability of choosing good j in a RUM 
where the deterministic utility of j is a function of price in State 1 and income y , whilst the 
deterministic utility of m is given by the maximum of the deterministic utilities for that 
good across States 0 and 1, i.e. W∗
m
= Max
{
Wm
(
p0
m
, y
)
,Wm
(
p1
m
, y
)}
 ; y∗
jj
= Min
{
ỹ11, ỹ22
}
 
defines the lower integration limits.
In equipping (27) with some intuition, it may be useful to refer back to Groups A, B 
and C in Sect. 3.2. The first element on the right-hand side of (27) takes account of Groups 
A and B; presuming that the same good is chosen in both states, it measures the expected 
income required in State 1 to maintain the utility arising in State 0. The second element on 
the right-hand side of (27) takes account of Group C, by acknowledging the possibility that, 
as prices change, preferences may change. In practice, the conditional Hicksian compen-
sating variation of Group C will fall somewhere between the compensating variations of 
(27)E(a) =
�
j=1,2
⎛⎜⎜⎝ỹjj?̂?j − �
ỹ
jj
y∗
jj
y
𝜕
⌢
𝜋j
𝜕y
dy
⎞⎟⎟⎠ for j,m = 1, 2 m ≠ j
sex
0p 1p
0x
O
0 1
1 1 1x x= =
1 1 1x xpi= ⋅
IEP
0
21 0.5pi− =
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21 pi− se
pix
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Fig. 4  Discrete-continuous demand for goods 1 and 2 in response to a price reduction, given a probabilistic 
discrete choice indicator
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Group A (i.e. zero) and Group B, hence the integration. Having accounted for the shares of 
Group A, B and C individuals within the population, and the expected income m required 
by each group, the expected Hicksian compensating variation is elicited from the identity:
A limitation of Karlström and Morey’s method is that neither ?̂?j nor 
⌢
𝜋j can be observed, 
since they are different RUMs from (8), and additional analysis is therefore required to 
derive these probabilities. This method, like McFadden’s, has not been widely adopted in 
practice.18
4.2.2  A Simple Method for Approximating the Expected Compensating Variation
Having developed an intuition for the expected compensating variation in the presence of 
non-linear income effects, Sect. 4.1 informs a simple alternative to McFadden’s and Karl-
ström and Morey’s methods, as follows. Since, with reference to the earlier definition of 
RUM (8), the random terms for goods 1 and 2 are assumed to be independent of prices and 
income, any change in prices for a given income affects only the deterministic utilities of 
goods 1 and 2. On this basis, let us take the total derivative of expected maximum utility:
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) noted the property that, if the distribution of the random 
terms is translationally invariant, the partial derivative of E(v∗) with respect to the deter-
ministic utility of good j yields the choice probability for that good. On this basis, (29) 
simplifies to:
The change in expected maximum utility (associated with a change in prices between 
States 0 and 1) can thus be represented as the expectation (in State 1) of the change 
(between States 0 and 1) in the deterministic utilities of goods 1 and 2. Comparing against 
its discrete choice counterpart, note that (30) admits benefits through both goods 1 and 
2, whereas (13) effectively admits benefits through the numeraire good only. This reflects 
the notion of multiple discrete choice in combination with unconstrained conditional 
demand—and the transition from the exposition of Fig. 3 to that of Fig. 4.
Whilst the identity (30) represents the expected change in Marshallian consumer sur-
plus, it also motivates the Hicksian or Slutsky analogue:
where b = h and b̃ = h̃ , or b = s and b̃ = s̃ , depending on whether Hicks’ or Slutsky’s ver-
sion of the compensating variation is employed, and remembering from (5) that 휋c
j
 rep-
resents the compensated probabilistic demand for good j = 1, 2 . Although (31) is intui-
tively clear, practical implementation is not straightforward, especially as the compensated 
probabilistic demands are unobservable. The obvious way forward is to employ the 
(28)E(h) = y − E(a)
(29)dE(v∗) =
휕E(v∗)
휕W1
dW1 +
휕E(v∗)
휕W2
dW2
(30)dE(v∗) = 휋1
(
퐩
1, y
)
dW1 + 휋2
(
퐩
1, y
)
dW2
(31)E(b) = 𝜋c1
(
퐩
1, u
)
⋅ b̃1 + 𝜋
c
2
(
퐩
1, u
)
⋅ b̃2
18 In a subsequent contribution, de Palma and Kilani (2011) have formalised and extended this approach, 
by distinguishing between the concepts of ‘choice’ and ‘transition’ probabilities [i.e. ?̂?j and 
⌢
𝜋j respectively 
in (27)], and demonstrating the impact of knowledge of the State 0 and/or State 1 probabilities on the preci-
sion of the estimated expected Hicksian compensating variation.
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uncompensated probabilistic demands as proxies, but since the latter demands are a func-
tion of income, this provokes the further question of how the income transactions h̃ and s̃ 
should be accounted for.
In a forerunner to the simulation method summarised in Sect. 4.2.1, McFadden (1995) 
proposed the following analytical bounds on the expected Hicksian compensating variation:
where the lower bound is based on the choice shares in State 0, the upper bound is based 
on the choice shares in State 1 after the unconditional Hicksian compensating variation 
has been transacted, and the conditional Hicksian compensating variation is specified inde-
pendently of the choice shares. Since the upper bound features two distinct notions of the 
compensating variation—unconditional and conditional, which conceivably inter-relate—
practical implementation necessitates ‘…simultaneous or iterative solution of the random 
utility model for the [compensating variation]’ (McFadden 1995, p. 11); this has been seen 
as a fundamental weakness of (32). If however we adopt a Slutsky approach to defining the 
bounds, then this weakness can be readily overcome, as we will now demonstrate.
Drawing reference to Figs. 3 and 4, let us specify the bounds19:
where s̃퐱0
j
 and s̃퐱
se
𝜋
j
 represent alternative measures of the conditional Slutsky compensating 
variation, arising from the following identities respectively20:
where:
With reference to (34) and (35), the conditional utilities are functional upon the condi-
tional prices of goods 1 and 2 and the residual budget after the conditional Slutsky compen-
sating variation has been transacted, whilst the probabilities continue to be defined in terms 
of the unconditional prices and the complete budget. With reference to (36), the conditional 
price of each good in State 0 is taken to be the maximum of the unconditional prices across 
both goods—this ensures compliance with (19) in the Do-Nothing. With reference to (37), 
the conditional price of each good in State 1 is then calculated to reflect the change in the 
(32)
∑
j=1,2
𝜋
j
(
퐩
0, y
)
⋅ h̃
j
≤ E(h) ≤∑
j=1,2
𝜋
j
(
퐩
1, y − h
)
⋅ h̃
j
(33)
∑
j=1,2
𝜋j
(
퐩
0, y
)
⋅ s̃퐱
0
j
≤ E(h) ≤∑
j=1,2
𝜋j
(
퐩
1, y
)
⋅ s̃
퐱
se
𝜋
j
(34)𝜋j
(
퐩
0, y
)
⋅ W
j
(
p̃0
j
, y
)
= 𝜋j
(
퐩
0, y
)
⋅ W
j
(
p̃1
j
, y − s̃퐱
0
j
)
for j = 1, 2
(35)𝜋j
(
퐩
0, y
)
⋅ W
j
(
p̃0
j
, y
)
= 𝜋j
(
퐩
1, y
)
⋅ W
j
(
p̃1
j
, y − s̃
퐱
se
𝜋
j
)
for j = 1, 2
(36)p̃0j = Max
{
p0
1
, p0
2
}
j = 1, 2
(37)p̃1j =
(
p1
j
− p0
j
)
+ p̃0
j
j = 1, 2
19 Note that the lower and upper bounds as defined here refer to a price reduction; for a price increase, s̃퐱
se
𝜋
j
 
will be associated with the lower bound, and s̃퐱0
j
 with the upper bound.
20 Of course, (34) readily simplifies to Wj
(
p̃0
j
, y
)
= W
j
(
p̃1
j
, y − s̃퐱
0
j
)
for j = 1, 2.
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unconditional price for that good, but from the starting point of the conditional price in State 0 
(as opposed to from the starting point of the unconditional price).
The identities (34) and (35) are motivated by the observation that, for the case of a single 
discrete choice, goods 1 and 2 are perfectly substitutable, implying that expected deterministic 
utility is constant along the relevant budget/indifference lines in Figs. 3 and 4. Moreover, (34) 
and (35) provide a device for determining where the budget/indifference lines pertaining to 
States 0 and 1 intersect, thereby identifying allocations of goods 1 and 2 relevant to the Slut-
sky decomposition of a price change. More specifically, and again drawing upon Groups A, B 
and C from Sect. 3.2, (34) and (35) yield the conditional Slutsky compensating variation for 
two polar cases:
• First, (34) pertains to the case where the choice shares remain constant before and after the 
price change, i.e. Groups A and B only. In other words, any substitution effect takes place 
through the conditional demand only.
• Second, (35) pertains to the case where goods 1 and 2 are perfectly substitutable and the 
choice shares exhibit the maximum possible change as price changes, i.e. Groups A, B and 
C. In other words, any substitution effect takes place primarily through the probabilistic 
demand, and the conditional demand accounts only for any residual substitution.
As will be apparent from Figs. 3 and 4, neither of the above polar cases is associated with an 
optimal consumption bundle (i.e. a point of tangency between the relevant budget/indifference 
lines), and this justifies the interpretation of s̃퐱0
j
 and s̃퐱
se
𝜋
j
 as the conditional Slutsky (as opposed 
to Hicksian) compensating variations.
For a price reduction, we would expect s̃퐱
se
𝜋
j
> s̃퐱
0
j
 , since if preferences change in response, 
then the conditional compensating variation of Group C would be greater than zero. Moreo-
ver, in the context of discrete–continuous demand, the lower bound of (33) is effectively the 
Laspeyres price index, whilst the upper bound is effectively the Paasche price index. For the 
choice shares in State 0, the lower bound gives the change in expenditure associated with 
the price change in State 1. For the choice shares in State 1, the upper bound does similarly. 
Since expected deterministic utility is constant along the initial budget/indifference line, the 
expected Hicksian compensating variation will fall within these bounds.
The key attraction of the simple method (33) is that it can be straightforwardly imple-
mented, using the observed choice shares and calculations of the conditional indirect utili-
ties from the discrete choice model. It could be deployed as a pragmatic approximation to 
McFadden’s (1995) and Karlström and Morey’s (2001) methods, or alternatively it could be 
deployed in tandem—since it yields additional insights on the potential range of the Hick-
sian compensating variation depending on the extent of switching between choice alternatives. 
Finally, aside from its simplicity, a further attraction of (33) is that it indexes by goods 1 and 
2, meaning that—unlike the log sum method—it straightforwardly elicits the contribution of 
each good to welfare change (Hyman and Daly 2014).
5  Illustrating the Practical Application of the Simple Method
Whilst lending itself to implementation through the discrete choice model, the simple method 
can in principle accommodate either linear (i.e. Figure 3) or non-linear (i.e. Figure 4) income 
effects. The present section will expand upon this proposition, by applying (33), (34) and (35) 
to both the discrete choice and discrete–continuous cases. In application, the distinguishing 
The Intuition Behind Income Effects of Price Changes in Discrete…
1 3
feature of these cases is the econometric specification of the conditional indirect utility func-
tion. That is to say, the discrete choice case should adhere to Assumptions I–V (Sect. 2.3), 
whilst the discrete–continuous case should relax some or all of Assumptions I–V (Sect. 4.1). 
This section comprises two sub-sections, the first developing a number of analytical examples, 
and the second developing an empirical example using real data.
5.1  Analytical Examples
5.1.1  Application of the Simple Method to McFadden (1981)
McFadden’s (1981) ‘residual income’ form is widely applied in practice, and entails the 
following specification of conditional indirect utility:
where 훽 is a parameter to be estimated. By definition, the specification (38) complies with 
Assumptions I–V detailed in Sect. 2.3 and, in so doing, excludes non-linear income effects 
of price changes. Furthermore, (38) implies the presence of the numeraire good, and is 
consistent therefore with the rationale illustrated in Fig. 3. Applying (38) to (34) and (35), 
we get:
Assuming the parameters to be common across States 0 and 1 (i.e. 훽0 = 훽1 = 훽 ), we can 
simplify (39) and (40), and solve for s̃퐱0
j
 and s̃퐱
se
𝜋
j
 respectively:
To illustrate the application of (41) and (42), let us consider a numerical example, 
involving a reduction in the price of good 2, with other prices held constant (i.e. faith-
ful to Fig. 3). Specifically, let us assume 훽 = 0.1 , y = 100 , p0
1
= p1
1
= 100 , p0
2
= 100 and 
p1
2
= 95 , such that consumption of the numeraire good is normalised to zero in State 0. 
Following the price reduction in State 1, however, continued compliance with Assumptions 
I–V necessitates diversion of the increased purchasing power to the numeraire good.
Assuming the random terms for goods 1 and 2 to be independently and identically dis-
tributed Multivariate Extreme Value (MEV), such that RUM is of the binary logit form, 
it is interesting to compare three alternative methods for measuring the expected change 
in consumer surplus across States 0 and 1. First, according to the simple method of 
(38)Wj = 훽 ⋅
(
y − pj
)
for j = 1, 2
(39)𝛽0 ⋅
(
y − p̃0
j
)
= 𝛽0 ⋅
(
y − s̃퐱
0
j
− p̃1
j
)
for j = 1, 2
(40)𝜋j
(
퐩
0, y
)
⋅ 𝛽1 ⋅
(
y − p̃0
j
)
= 𝜋j
(
퐩
1, y
)
⋅ 𝛽1 ⋅
(
y − s̃
퐱
se
𝜋
j
− p̃1
j
)
for j = 1, 2
(41)s̃퐱
0
j
=
(
p̃0
j
− p̃1
j
)
for j = 1, 2
(42)s̃퐱
se
𝜋
j
=
(
y − p̃1
j
)
−
𝜋0
j
𝜋1
j
⋅
(
y − p̃0
j
)
for j = 1, 2
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calculating the lower and upper bounds on the expected Hicksian compensating variation 
(33)21:
Second, according to the traditional log sum measure (13):
Third, according to the widely used ‘rule-of-a-half’ (RoH) approximation to consumer 
surplus change (Lane et al. 1971; Neuburger 1971):
In other words, for the case of a single discrete choice, the average of the lower and 
upper bounds yields both the log sum and RoH measures.22 These results accord with theo-
retical results first reported by Hicks (1942), and subsequently refined by Diewert (1992) 
and Hillinger (2001). Given perfect substitution between goods 1 and 2 and the absence 
of non-linear income effects, we would expect the RoH to equal both the average of the 
Laspeyres and Paasche price indexes, and the average of the Hicksian compensating and 
equivalent variations.
At this juncture, it is appropriate to revisit the earlier discussion in Sect.  3.1 around 
unconditional and conditional prices. Consistent with the diagrammatic exposition of 
Sects. 3 and 4, the worked example above assumed y = p0
1
= p0
2
= 100 , thus implying the 
normalisation x0
n
||훿+
j
= 0 for j = 1, 2 . Let us now relax this normalisation by instead assum-
ing 훽 = 0.1 , y = 100 , p0
1
= p1
1
= 100 , p0
2
= 95 and p1
2
= 90 . This case entails the same 
absolute reduction in the price of good 2 as before, but from a different starting point—
given that some consumption of the numeraire good is now introduced in the Do-Nothing. 
With reference to (36) and (37):
2.50 ≤ E(h) ≤ 3.11
ΔE(v)∕휆 = 2.81
RoH =
∑
j=1,2
1∕2
(
p0
j
− p1
j
)(
휋0
j
+ 휋1
j
)
= 2.81
p̃0
1
= p̃0
2
= Max
{
p0
1
, p0
2
}
= 100
p̃1
1
=
(
p1
1
− p0
1
)
+ p̃0
1
= (100 − 100) + 100 = 100
p̃1
2
=
(
p1
2
− p0
2
)
+ p̃0
2
= (90 − 95) + 100 = 95
21 Acknowledging the weakness of (32), McFadden (1995) also proposed a simplified version based on the 
expected change in deterministic utility:
where ΔWj = Wj
(
p1
j
, y
)
−Wj
(
p0
j
, y
)
 and 휆j is the conditional marginal utility of income. Although this 
measure is path dependent, in the case of linear income effects it gives the same bounds as (32).
∑
j=1,2
휋j
(
퐩
0, y
)
⋅ ΔWj
/
휆j ≤ E(h) ≤
∑
j=1,2
휋j
(
퐩
1, y
)
⋅ ΔWj
/
휆j for j = 1, 2
22 For the specification of conditional indirect utility (38), we can show the equivalence between the aver-
age of the lower and upper bounds and the RoH as follows:
With reference to (16), but retaining the assumption of zero consumption of the numeraire, we would 
expect budget to be exhausted in the case of a single discrete choice, i.e. x̃0
j
= y∕p0
j
= 1 for j = 1, 2, which 
permits simplification to:
1∕2
(
𝜋0
j
s̃퐱
0
j
+ 𝜋1
j
s̃
퐱
se
𝜋
j
)
= 1∕2
(
𝜋0
j
⋅
(
p0
j
− p1
j
)
+ 𝜋1
j
⋅
(
y − p1
j
)
− 𝜋0
j
⋅
(
y − p0
j
))
for j = 1, 2
1∕2
(
𝜋0
j
s̃퐱
0
j
+ 𝜋1
j
s̃
퐱
se
𝜋
j
)
= 1∕2
(
p0
j
− p1
j
)(
𝜋0
j
+ 𝜋1
j
)
for j = 1, 2
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Repeating the comparison of alternative measures of the expected change in consumer 
surplus, we now get the following bounds from the simple method:
By comparison, the log sum gives ΔE(v)∕휆 = 3.39 and the rule-of-a-half RoH = 3.38 . 
Thus, aside from slight rounding error, the average of the lower and upper bounds again 
yields both the log sum and RoH measures.
5.1.2  Application of the Simple Method to Karlström and Morey (2001)
Karlström and Morey (2001) asserted that the application of a power term to McFad-
den’s residual income specification offers a means of admitting non-linear income effects 
of price (and lump sum income) changes, i.e. consistent with the rationale illustrated in 
Fig. 4. More specifically, Karlström and Morey considered a three-alternative choice set, 
and specified conditional indirect utility:
If the three goods exhibit common prices [as should apply conditionally following (19)] 
then (43) complies with Assumptions I–IV, but not Assumption V, and thus admits non-
linear income effects.23 If however prices are not common (as might apply unconditionally) 
then Assumptions III and IV are also relaxed. Substituting for (43) in (34) and (35), and 
solving for the conditional compensating variation, we have:
Karlström and Morey illustrated the application of (43) within (27) by way of a numeri-
cal example; this involved an increase in the price of good 1 between States 0 and 1, 
with other prices held constant, and the random terms again independently and identi-
cally distributed MEV. Specifically, they assumed 훽 = 0.1 , y = 100 , p0
1
= 94.5 , p1
1
= 95 , 
p0
2
= p1
2
= 95 and p0
3
= p1
3
= 96 . On this basis, and with reference to (28), Karlström and 
Morey reported:
Developing the same example using the simple method of calculating the lower and 
upper bounds on the expected Hicksian compensating variation (33), we get:
3.11 ≤ E(h) ≤ 3.66
(43)Wj = 훽 ⋅
(
y − pj
)2
for j = 1, 2, 3
s̃퐱
0
j
=
(
p̃0
j
− p̃1
j
)
for j = 1, 2, 3
s̃
퐱
se
𝜋
j
=
(
y − p̃1
j
)
−
(
𝜋0
j
𝜋1
j
⋅
(
y − p̃0
j
)2)0.5
for j = 1, 2, 3
E(h) = y − E(a) = 100 − 100.24 = −0.24
−0.27 ≤ E(h) ≤ −0.17
23 Batley and Ibáñez (2013b) challenged the theoretical validity of Karlström and Morey’s specification 
(43). This is because (43) embodies two features which are mutually exclusive; it admits path dependence 
but restricts conditional demand to a single discrete choice. In other words, by imposing Assumption I, (43) 
does not perfectly align with the rationale behind Fig. 4.
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whilst the log sum yields ΔE(v)
/
?̄?0 = −0.26 (noting that in this case there is a need to 
average the conditional marginal utility of income across goods), and the rule-of-a-half 
yields RoH = −0.24.
Karlström and Morey also repeated the same example using an alternative specification 
of conditional indirect utility:
In this case, they calculated E(h) = −0.17 , whilst the simple method (33) yields the 
bounds −0.17 ≤ E(h) ≤ −0.17 , the log sum gives ΔE(v)/ ?̄?0 = −0.16 , and the rule-of-a-
half gives RoH = −0.17 . The closeness of the alternative measures for these two examples 
reflects the fact that, whilst non-linear income effects are prevalent, they are trivial in mag-
nitude. This is an implication of the specifications (43) and (44), which impose Assump-
tion I irrespective of the prevailing prices.
5.2  Empirical Examples
Building upon the previous section, this section illustrates the empirical application of the 
simple method by re-analysing the dataset used by Karlström and Morey (2001) to illus-
trate their expected compensating variation method.24
5.2.1  Data
The dataset originates from Morey et al. (1993), and entails a sample of 168 Maine fisher-
men self-reporting salmon fishing trips made to eight rivers (five in the Maine area of the 
United States and three in Canada) during 1988. In Morey et al., these reported trips were 
translated into a destination choice model where, for each fishing trip (up to a maximum of 
fifty during the year), destination was modelled as a function of trip costs (i.e. price) and 
catch rates (i.e. as an indicator of quality) associated with each site. The choice set also 
includes the possibility of not making a fishing trip to one of the eight named rivers on 
a given weekend, thus admitting annual trip rates (to these eight rivers) of less than fifty. 
Indeed, 13.3 trips on average were made during the year, and the most popular destination 
was the Penobscot River in the US. Socio-economic variables, such as club membership, 
age and years of experience, are also included in the dataset.
5.2.2  Model Specification
The original model specification reported in Morey et  al. (1993) was a three-level 
(repeated) nested logit model. Karlström and Morey (2001) consolidated this into a 
two-level nested logit model, as the original model specification violated global regu-
larity conditions. For our own purposes, we further reduced complexity by restricting 
the model to the multinomial logit (MNL) specification but—with some qualifications 
concerning the number of attributes—retained the original specification of the util-
ity functions. More specifically, we included income effects of price changes via the 
components 훽0 ⋅ (y − pj) + 훽1 ⋅ (y − pj)0.5 , which embody linear and non-linear income 
(44)Wj = 훽 ⋅
(
y − pj
)0.5
for j = 1, 2, 3
24 In exploiting this dataset, we acknowledge the underpinning works: Karlström and Morey (2001), Morey 
et al (1993), Morey et al (2001), and Breffle and Morey (2000).
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effects respectively. Following earlier discussion in Sect. 5.1.2, note that if the differ-
ent fishing trips entail common prices (as should apply conditionally), then this speci-
fication also complies with Assumptions I–IV, but relaxes Assumption V; if however 
prices are not common (as might apply unconditionally) then Assumptions III and IV 
are also relaxed. Whilst our earlier concerns regarding this specification (footnote 23) 
are relevant, we retained this specification so as to remain faithful to Morey et  al’s 
representation of income effects. One departure from Morey et al. was that we omit-
ted socio-economic and quality variables, so as to align the empirical analysis with 
the earlier theoretical analysis of Sects. 4 and 5. There would seem to be no reason in 
principle why the simple method for measuring the compensating variation could not 
be extended to accommodate quality as well as price changes, but this extension falls 
beyond the scope of the present paper.
5.2.3  Results
We began the empirical analysis by estimating a simplified MNL model with utility 
specified to be linear in residual income (i.e. assuming 훽1 = 0 , thereby eliminating the 
second of the two income effects stated above), but omitting alternative specific con-
stants, quality and other socio-economic variables as previously discussed. The esti-
mation results for this model, referred to as Model (I), are reported in Table 1, where 
price is associated with a positive coefficient (i.e. 𝛽0 > 0 ) given the ‘residual income’ 
formulation of utility.
Having estimated Model (I) on Morey et  al’s data (thereby establishing State 0), 
we then introduced the policy scenario of a $5 dollar increase in the price of fishing 
at the Penobscot River only (State 1). Applying this policy scenario to Model (I), we 
estimated the welfare change using six alternative methods, namely: (1) the log sum 
method; (2) McFadden’s simulation method; (3) Morey et al’s representative consumer 
method; (4) Karlström and Morey’s analytical method; (5) the simple bounds method 
proposed in this paper; and (6) the RoH. More specifically, for each fisherman in the 
sample, the welfare impact of the price change was calculated for each fishing trip, and 
then multiplied by fifty to elicit the annual welfare impact.
Since Model (I) embodied linear income effects of price changes, the ‘natural’ 
method for estimating welfare change is the log sum; recall from Sect.  2.4 that the 
log sum implies Assumptions I–V. Taking the average across the 168 fishermen of the 
annual welfare loss due to the $5 increase at the Penobscot River, the log sum returns 
an estimate of $40.71 (see the second column of Table 2). The same estimate is recov-
ered by the Karlström and Morey and Morey et al. methods, whilst the estimates from 
the McFadden, RoH and simple methods diverge only slightly from the log sum.
The next stage of the empirical analysis involved re-estimating the MNL model to 
incorporate both linear and non-linear income effects of price changes (i.e. relaxing the 
assumption β1 = 0), and this is reported as Model (II) in Table 1. Model (II) was then 
applied as before to estimate the welfare change under State 1 vis-à-vis State 0. Given 
the presence of non-linear income effects, the log sum is no longer appropriate, and the 
estimated welfare loss of $53.33 is therefore somewhat of an outlier when compared 
to the estimates from the other methods. Again, the simple method generates bounds 
which (with the exception of the log sum) tightly envelope the other welfare estimates 
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but, given the presence of non-linear income effects, the average of the bounds now 
diverges from the RoH. Moreover, this reflects the general result that we would expect 
to see: for a price increase (decrease), the log sum overestimates (underestimates) the 
consumer surplus loss (gain). This is because the log sum underestimates the extent of 
switching between goods 1 and 2 in the event of a price change.
6  Synthesis and Conclusions
Adopting the presentation by S&R, we introduced a problem of discrete–continuous 
demand whereby an individual is offered a discrete choice between two mutually exclusive 
goods; conditional upon that choice, he/she consumes a positive quantity of the chosen 
good and potentially also a positive quantity of a numeraire good, subject to the constraint 
of budget. In the context of this problem, we considered the impacts of a price change on 
demand and consumer surplus, for a range of practical consumption situations. We dis-
sected the separate contributions of the discrete choice and conditional demands to the 
overall demand response, and we further dissected the demand response into income and 
substitution effects. A key contribution of S&R was the derivation of a consumer surplus 
measure specific to the discrete choice component of demand; an example of this measure 
is the ‘log sum’ measure, which has been applied extensively in public policy analysis. 
Against this background, we arrive at the following conclusions:
1. If Assumptions I–V (Sect. 2.3) are imposed on S&R’s model of discrete–continuous 
demand, then the model is restricted to a single discrete choice (i.e. conditional demand 
is fixed at one), and we derive the notion of a probabilistic demand function. This pro-
vides a theoretical basis—in terms of microeconomics—for the Random Utility Model 
(RUM). These assumptions also imply that, if the conditional demand is to comply with 
the budget condition, then goods 1 and 2 should be reconstituted as composites of the 
numeraire good, and face common conditional prices.
2. S&R’s consumer surplus measure (12) arises from the integration of the probabilistic 
demand, and is underpinned by Assumptions I–V. Although it is widely acknowledged 
that (12) excludes non-linear income effects of a price change on goods 1 and 2, we have 
clarified that, in the absence of the numeraire good, linear income effects and substitu-
tion effects are also excluded. If, however, we admit the numeraire good, then this can 
proxy for both:
• Quasi-linear income effects; these relate to ‘Group B’ individuals, who do not 
switch between goods following a price change, and;
• Substitution effects; these relate to ‘Group C’ individuals, who switch between 
goods.
  Moreover, in practical implementations of (12), such as the popular ‘log sum’ measure 
(13), the change in expected consumer surplus associated with a price change will be 
capitalised entirely in terms of the numeraire good. The magnitude of this surplus will 
depend upon the proportions of Group B and C individuals within the population, and 
the relative strength of preferences for goods 1 and 2 in the case of Group C.
3. In order to admit non-linear income effects of price (and lump sum income) changes, we 
must relax some or all of Assumptions I–V, and revert from the discrete choice model, 
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to the model of discrete–continuous demand. More specifically, within the discrete–con-
tinuous demand model, we must relax:
• Assumptions I and II, in order to admit linear income effects of price changes where 
there is no change in the relative shares of goods 1 and 2.
• Assumptions I, II and III, in order to admit linear income effects of lump sum 
income changes where there is a change in the relative shares.
• Assumptions I, II and IV, in order to admit linear income effects of price changes 
where there is a change in the relative shares.
• Assumptions I, II, IV and V, in order to admit non-linear income effects of price 
changes.
4. Recognising the limitations of S&R’s consumer surplus measure, McFadden (1995) 
and Karlström and Morey (2001) devised methods for measuring the expected Hicksian 
compensating variation in the presence of non-linear income effects. However, both 
methods call for significant computational and/or analytical effort following estimation 
of the discrete choice model, and this perhaps explains why neither method has been 
widely adopted in practice. The present paper proposed a simple method for approxi-
mating the expected Hicksian compensating variation. This entails the derivation of 
analytical bounds, where one bound is given by the expected Slutsky compensating 
variation in the event of zero substitution between goods, and the other bound is given 
by the corresponding measure in the event of maximum substitution between goods. 
Table 1  Models of destination 
choice for salmon fishing based 
on Morey et al. (1993)
Model (I): Linear price 
only
Model (II): Linear and 
non-linear price only
Estimate Robust t-stat. Estimate Robust t-stat.
Price—linear 0.018 79.0 0.013 3.7
Price—sqrt – – 0.377 1.1
Obs 8400 8400
N 168 168
LL − 6688.7 − 6688.0
Table 2  Expected annual welfare 
impact (in US$) per fisherman 
of $5 increase in price of fishing 
at the Penobscot River, based on 
Morey et al. (1993)
Method Welfare impact from 
Model (I)
Welfare impact 
from Model (II)
Log sum − 40.71 − 53.33
McFadden − 40.70 − 40.82
Morey et al. − 40.71 − 40.90
Karlström and Morey − 40.71 − 40.84
Lower bound − 42.03 − 42.16
Upper bound − 39.41 − 40.06
Average of upper and lower 
bounds
− 40.72 − 41.11
Rule-of-a-half (RoH) − 40.72 − 40.84
 R. Batley, T. Dekker 
1 3
These bounds correspond to the Laspeyres and Paasche price indexes for the context of 
discrete–continuous demand.
5. The attraction of the simple method is that it can be straightforwardly implemented 
using the observed choice shares and calculations of the conditional indirect utilities. 
It could be deployed as a pragmatic approximation to extant methods for measuring 
the expected Hicksian compensating variation, or it could even be deployed in tandem 
with extant methods. In the latter case, the simple method yields additional insights 
on the potential range of the Hicksian compensating variation depending on the extent 
of switching between choice alternatives, as well as on the attribution of the Hicksian 
compensating variation to the relevant choice alternatives.
6. Comparing the simple method for approximating the expected Hicksian compensating 
variation against the log sum and rule-of-a-half methods, we demonstrated empirically 
that, for a price increase (decrease), the log sum overestimates (underestimates) the 
consumer surplus loss (gain).
7. Whilst beyond the scope of the present paper, the simple method for measuring the 
compensating variation could—through the concept of ‘generalised cost’ (McIntosh 
and Quarmby 1970)—be readily extended to accommodate quality changes as well as 
price changes. In the case of the residual income formulation of the utility function (as 
used in Sect. 5), the simple method can also accommodate lump sum income changes, 
but this extension does not hold for other utility formulations.
At the beginning of this paper, we introduced S&R’s framework of discrete–continuous 
demand. This framework distinguishes between the consumption choices across different 
dimensions, and the quantity of consumption along any single dimension, that give rise to 
the overall observed demand. The paper has shown that, in terms of this framework, any 
non-linear income effects of a price change will be associated with the quantity of demand 
conditional upon choice (in the context of the expected demand), and not with choice per 
se. We conclude that, if non-linear income effects are relevant to the empirical context of 
application, then the analyst should relax Assumptions I–V, move from a discrete choice 
framework to a discrete–continuous one, and calculate expected consumer surplus change 
using a path independent measure such as the one proposed in this paper.
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